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ABSTRAK  
Tulisan ini berisi penjelasan mengenai struktur dan perkembangan makroekonomi 
Indonesia dengan refrensi khusus yang disediakan untuk dapat memahami alasan utama 
yang menyebabkan Indonesia mengalami penderitaan dalam bidang ekonomi selama 
krisis keuangan Asia tahun 1997-1998. Kami menemukan bahwa kelemahan pokok 
makroekonomi dalam perekonomian Indonesia adalah sebagai hal yang bertanggung 
jawab pada runtuhnya ekonomi, dan bukannya krisis keuangan Asia, sebagai perten-
tangan pada pandangan lain mengenai efek penularan (contagion effect). Diskusi 
mengenai perubahan kebijakan moneter dan fiskal yang telah dilakukan saat ini juga akan 
dibahas. 
Keywords: Indonesia, Asian financial crisis, macroeconomic, fiscal policy, monetary 
policy  
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INTRODUCTION  
This paper contains an exposition of the 
macroeconomic structure and developments of 
Indonesia with special attention devoted to 
certain economic variables that play key roles 
in promoting macroeconomic stability. 
Furthermore, we devote specific discussion to 
understand the underlying reason that caused 
Indonesia to suffer economically during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998. A special 
reference towards change in monetary and 
fiscal policy conduct will be discussed as well. 
This paper will begin by giving a brief 
overview of the Indonesian economy, and 
continues with a detailed discussion of 
stylized facts regarding the Asian financial 
crisis and its impact on Indonesia. The 
discussion has shown that the frail 
macroeconomic fundamental of the Indone-
sian economy is the one responsible for the 
collapse of the economy vis-à-vis the Asian 
financial crisis as opposed to the alternative 
view of the “contagion” effect. Finally we 
conclude by outlining a brief analysis and 
insights regarding key macroeconomic 
variables in relation with the recent conduct of 
monetary and fiscal policy.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 
2 gives an overview of the development of the 
Indonesian economy from 1963 up to a period 
before the financial crisis set in. Section 3 
discusses about the incidence of financial 
crisis in Indonesia. Indonesian macroe-
conomic condition after the financial crisis 
will be the main issue discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 is especially devoted on the 
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discussion of fiscal and monetary policy 
conduct along with their recent changes. 
Section 6 concludes.  
OVERVIEW OF THE INDONESIAN 
ECONOMY: TRENDS AND DEVELOP-
MENTS  
In this section, we will discuss the 
macroeconomic performance of Indonesia 
starting from the year 1970 onwards. Many 
economic observers and policy-makers, as 
well as academics, have been impressed and 
surprised by the remarkable and outstanding 
economic progress achieved by Indonesia 
during the 1970s and 1980s (see, for example, 
Booth 1981, 1986; Gillis 1984, 1988, 
Sundrum 1980; Warr 1986). This process of 
development has been studied thoroughly and 
intensely by economists and policy-makers in 
the international forum, which recognized 
Indonesia as one of the High Performing 
Asian Economies (HPAE) as coined by the 
World Bank. Tongzon (2002), in the second 
edition of his book, gives a number of 
important insights regarding the economies of 
ASEAN countries, their developments, and 
future challenges. In particular, we would like 
to draw on some crucial points and to tap into 
the insights in his book regarding the 
Indonesian economy in the following 
exposition.  
Indonesia is basically a market-based 
economy, just like most of the ASEAN
1
 
economies, with prominent state intervention 
in several major sectors (e.g. provision of 
public roads, highways, public schools and 
state-funded universities, electricity services, 
etc). Secondly, Indonesia’s trade performance 
is worthy of emphasis since it is highly 
comparable to the rest of the Asian Tigers in 
terms of export-led performance
2
. Her export-
                                                          
1  ASEAN currently consists of Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.  
2  Asian Tigers refer to the Asian countries that have 
achieved a remarkable economic growth and perfor-
oriented economy has provided strong evi-
dence for the proposition of export-led growth 
as shown by the high volume of trade and 
especially the high degree of export-import 
dependence
3
. For example, in the 1960s up to 
1980s Indonesia experienced an average 
export growth of 7.6680 percent. Subse-
quently, the export growth rate surge up to an 
average of 9 percent from the middle of 1980s 
to the middle of 1990s. Thirdly, the economic 
aspirations of Indonesia are heavily centred on 
the importance of enhancing economic growth 
since Indonesia has a substantial history of 
poverty, under-provision in the labour market, 
and under-development in major social and 
economic sectors. Lastly, the Indonesian 
economy is of the dualistic type whereby more 
than 60 percent of the population live in the 
agricultural and rural areas with the rest of the 
population living in the major cities. 
Indonesia is blessed with rich agricultural 
and mineral resources (i.e. oil, natural gas, 
sulphur, etc). Moreover, her abundant supply 
of human resources makes her labour costs 
relatively low as compared to similar econo-
mies around the region. The large domestic 
market and an extensive period of political 
stability as well as impressive economic deve-
lopment and expansion during the Soeharto 
regime have attracted foreign and domestic 
investments in sectors like manufacturing, 
services, and financial industries.  
The strengths of the Indonesian economy 
are not without its weaknesses. The main 
drawback is the low level of efficiency in the 
bureaucracy and the quality of the rural and 
suburban basic infrastructures. Although it 
will not be discussed at all in this thesis, 
political stability is one vocal point worth 
noting as an important ingredient to ensure the 
sustainability of economic development. This 
                                                                            
mance over this last decade or so, such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
3  See Feder (1983), Balassa (1985), Ram (1985), 
Salvatore & Hatcher (1991), Greenaway & Sapsford 
(1994) for discussion regarding export-led growth 
theory and evidence.  
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is especially the case after the fall of 
Soeharto’s new order regime, whereby a 
number of domestic disputes and incidents 
remained unsolved, such as the Aceh Freedom 
Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)), 
incidents in Ambon and Maluku, fuel price 
hike, and the recent Bali bombings amongst 
others. Thus, they expose the country to some 
unfavourable effects in promoting economic 
stability and sustained growth.  
From the 1970s onwards, Indonesia faced 
a major economic problem, namely the 
persistence of high inflation rates reaching 
their peak during the oil-induced economic 
boom in 1974
4
. Within this decade, major 
monetary and fiscal policies were directed to 
fight inflation and they have proven to work 
successfully and effectively. Some studies 
have also been conducted to analyze the 
performance of the Indonesian economy such 
as Aghevli (1977), Aghevli et al (1979), Arndt 
(1979), Nasution (1983), Gillis (1984), Parikh 
et al (1985), Warr (1986), and Sundrum 
(1986, 1988) in the areas of macroeconomic 
development, monetary sector, financial 
institutions, as well as fiscal and monetary 
policies.  
During the time period of 1970–1981, 
income per capita in Indonesia has risen 
steadily from US$ 80.4 to a remarkable US$ 
486.3, recording an excellent 505 percent 
growth over the period. Real GDP has been 
quite stable throughout 1970–1990, recording 
an average growth of around 6.9  percent 
annually, higher than average Asian real GDP 
growth of around 6.4 percent. Inflation was 
reasonably stable (although some sub-periods 
still recorded high figures such as 21.7 percent 
in 1973–1978 and 15.5 percent in 1979–1981) 
                                                          
4  During this period, the hike in oil price was more than 
quadrupled as can be seen from the world oil price 
index that rose from 5.8 to 126.4 within the time frame 
of 1970 – 1981. It then fell to 100 in 1982 – 1985, 
before it rose again slightly from 64.7 to 77.8 in 1986 – 
1990. The latter figures shown more stable figure as 
compared to the initial oil price hike (van der Meulen 
Rodgers, 1994).  
at around 7–9  percent and it settled down to a 
level of 7.4 percent at the end of 1980. The 
share of exports in GDP rose steadily to a 
record of 29.3 percent in 1979–1981 before it 
fell to 22.3 percent in early 1990. 
Correspondingly, non-oil exports have risen 
steadily over the decades as the contribution 
and significance of this “new” source of 
growth increased. Non-oil exports recorded a 
12.2 percent share of GDP in 1990, much 
higher than the 7.8 percent in early 1970. 
Imports have been rising steadily as well but 
the growth rate of imports has been stable 
from 12.3 percent in 1970 to 16.6 percent in 
1990. Current account deficits have always 
been a staple feature of the Indonesian 
economy but it reached a lower level of −2.7 
percent in 1990 as compared to −4.3 percent 
in the previous sub periods of 1982-1985. The 
latter was the period where the global 
economic recession took the repercussion 
effect and Indonesia was affected as well. 
Reflecting these structural changes, the share 
of agriculture in the economy has fallen 
steadily from 42.0 percent to a mere 23.4 
percent in early 1990 whereas the industrial 
and services sectors have recorded substantial 
increments from 21.6 percent and 36.4 percent 
to 36.8 percent and 39.8 percent respectively. 
During the time period of 1970–1990, 
Indonesia has witnessed a vast recovery and 
rapid economic growth and this time period up 
to the early 1990 can be viewed as the 
resurgence of the Indonesian economy after 
her independence.   
The development process and progress of 
the Indonesian economy during the period of 
1970-1995 can be divided into three major 
time frames. This is done to provide 
comprehensive descriptions of the major 
economic milestones of the economy. The 
period after 1995 will be discussed separately 
and can be considered as the most recent 
development of the Indonesia economy that 
involves numerous dynamic adjustments and 
structural changes such as the notable incident 
of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
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The resurgence of the Indonesian economy 
and the primary oil boom (1963-1980)  
It appears that history dictated that during 
the first two decades after Indonesia 
proclaimed its independence, she was to face 
some major economic obstacles such as the 
problem of hyperinflation, extreme unemploy-
ment, and uncontrollable population growth 
that created major structural problems for the 
newborn nation. It then reached the brink of 
economic disaster when the inflation rate 
soared up to 600 percent annually i.e. hyperin-
flation, coupled with economic stagnation
5
. 
The resurgence in the economy began 
with the inception of the so-called “neworder” 
regime under Soeharto’s leadership with the 
well-known and successful Five Year Deve-
lopment Plan (REPELITA: Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun) which started in 
the year of 1968. During this period and 
subsequently, Indonesia has shown a 
remarkable improvement in economic growth, 
a substantial reduction in the inflation rate, 
and job creation in several sectors of the 
economy. Export-led growth was identified as 
the main source of this magnificent increase in 
the country’s economic performance along 
with the voluminous amount of foreign aid 
received from 1970 to 1972. Moreover, the 
first oil shock from 1973 to 1974 which was 
followed by the second one from 1979 to 1981 
have enabled Indonesia to experience strong 
and improved macroeconomic performance as 
well as her remarkable trade activities. This 
was because Indonesia was a net oil exporter 
country and enjoyed great benefits from hikes 
in oil price and moreover, during that period, 
some concerted efforts have been made by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) to sustain a reasonably high 
oil price. Consequently, this increase in the oil 
revenue has benefited the whole economy 
during that period. In addition to that, the 
                                                          
5  Altogether, this condition is referred to as “stagflation” 
by some economists and has been a subject of thorough 
discussion since the oil price shocks of the 1970s. 
export of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
starting from the year 1977 boosted the 
economic performance of Indonesia even 
further.  
This improvement, however, has pushed 
the domestic inflation rate up but not as 
severely as was experienced before. Some 
prudent economic policies have also been 
implemented in order to maintain her 
economic performance. In 1978, a preventive 
measure of exchange rate devaluation also 
helped Indonesia to restrain the diminishing 
value of her relative exports price incentives 
to less than 5 percent (van der Meulen 
Rodgers 1994). This was Indonesia’s first 
major devaluation of the exchange rate as a 
response to the external shocks hitting the 
economy.  
Table 1 shows selected key macroeco-
nomic variables of Indonesia and we can see 
that after the year 1963, GDP growth has been 
fairly stable and it recorded an extensive 
period of positive growth. Most notably, in 
1968 when the government started the first 
five-year development plan, GDP growth 
recorded the highest growth of 12.03 percent. 
On average, Indonesia recorded 6.25 percent 
output growth through the primary oil boom 
period. The GDP per capita growth averaged 
3.83 percent in this 18-years period (1963–
1980) with most notable achievement during 
the initial implementation of REPELITA that 
recorded a remarkable growth of 9.45 percent. 
After 1968, GDP per capita growth has been 
positive throughout the years and recorded an 
average rate of 5.7 percent. The inflation rate, 
by and large, still recorded high volatility 
ranging from a maximum of 1136 percent in 
1966 to a minimum of 4.36 percent in 1971. 
The IMF-sponsored stabilization and debt 
restructuring program in the early 1970s has 
successfully resulted into a fall in the inflation 
rate to reach 8.11 percent in 1978. 
Nevertheless, inflation has been, and still is, 
the major enemy of the Indonesian economy 
as we can see from the high inflation record 
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and it tends to fluctuate with business cycles 
and changes in monetary and fiscal policies. 
Export growth has recorded a substantial 
progress from a negative range in 1963–1966 
to a startling growth after the inception of the 
five-year development plan. It recorded a 
15.77 percent growth during the first 
REPELITA as compared to only 7.67 percent 
for the whole period within this first 
milestone. Needless to say, export has been a 
new source of economic growth for Indonesia 
during this time period as we have mentioned 
above, being further fuelled by the oil boom.  
Economic slowdown and global recession 
(1980-1986)  
The fall in oil prices and increasing 
current account deficits ushered Indonesia into 
a period of economic slowdown beginning 
from the early 1980s. The GDP growth figure 
dropped considerably during this period and 
was falling behind other Asian countries. The 
global recession in the early 1980s was 
acknowledged as the main cause of this slow 
economic growth. Both domestic and foreign 
investments fell during this period and 
government expenditures on large capital 
intensive projects were also reduced as a 
response to lower oil revenues —the major 
source of income for the economy. Export 
earnings fell and the volume of debts 
increased in response to higher world interest 
rates during this tough economic period for 
the global economy and in particular, for 
Indonesian economy.  
Many jobs were also lost since many 
firms were unable to operate due to capital 
withdrawal or the cancellation of some major 
projects that required major capital and labour 
Table 1 Selected Key Macroeconomic Indicators of Indonesia, 1963-1980 (in %) 
Year  Real GDP Growth  Inflation Rate  
GDP Per Capita 
Growth  
Nominal Exports 
Growth  
1963  -2.25  145.91  -4.33  -6.23  
1964  3.45  108  1.21  11.83  
1965  0.95  306.76  -1.28  -3.60  
1966  2.85  1136.25  0.54  -1.26  
1967  1.13  106  -1.18  0.36  
1968  12.03  128.84  9.45  9.98  
1969  7.48  15.52  4.97  14.85  
1970  8.15  12.35  5.61  17.10  
1971  6.70  4.36  4.46  15.71  
1972  7.88  6.51  5.28  21.21  
1973  9.78  31.04  7.13  18.64  
1974  8.26  40.60  5.67  6.56  
1975  6.18  19.05  3.71  -2.42  
1976  5.60  19.86  3.40  17.02  
1977  8.64  11.04  6.14  9.45  
1978  9.21  8.11  6.82  1  
1979  7.10  16.26  4.84  2.29  
1980  8.73  18.02  6.50  5.53  
Average  6.25  118.64  3.83  7.67  
Source: World Development Indicators CD ROM (World Bank, 2004)  
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expenditures, especially by government. The 
drop in investments figures also catalyzed the 
worsening trend of unemployment during that 
period. Auspiciously, Indonesia was still able 
to report a modest real GDP growth of 4 
percent annually and still maintain a much 
lower figure for debt costs as compared to 
other problematic debtors and stagnant 
economies during that period such as Mexico 
and the Philippines. Indonesia’s second major 
devaluation also occurred within this econo-
mic slowdown period in 1983. This step was 
supported by government efforts to control 
money growth with the implementation of 
new monetary policy instruments which was 
aimed specifically at realigning the exchange 
rate system in order to maintain Indonesia’s 
competitiveness in the trade sectors.  
Table 2 shows that GDP growth fell 
substantially to 1.1 percent in 1982 as the 
world entered into global recession. Inflation 
soared into double digits in 1982 and 1983 to 
record 11.79 percent and 10.46 percent 
respectively. The current account deficits 
widened in this time of recession and export 
growth shrunk considerably by 18 percent and 
9 percent in the early 1980s. The second major 
devaluation in the exchange rate did help 
Indonesia to record a substantial GDP growth 
of 8.45 percent which is comparable to the 
level of sustained growth and subsequently 
inflation was brought down to around 4.8 
percent in 1984. Export growth also showed 
signs of recovery near the end of this second 
milestone to record 15.21 percent growth.  
The secondary boom: non-oil recovery period 
and non-oil export revival (1986-1995)  
This period was marked substantially by 
the improvements in real income growth and 
the current account —through reductions in 
the current account deficit— fuelled by non-
oil domestic exports growth. The falling trend 
of oil price stabilized in 1986 and most 
economies started to realign its major policies 
and expenditures programs in this period as 
well. Indonesia also conducted her third major 
devaluation in 1986 whereby the government 
allowed the Rupiah to depreciate far more 
rapidly than before and the money supply 
growth rate to increase. This policy, however, 
resulted in a lower inflation rate than the 
previous period which might be explained by 
the resurgence in the non-oil exports that was 
boosted by devaluated exchange rate, a relati-
vely small decline in fiscal expenditures, and 
the price controls imposed by the government 
on several key commodities and services.  
Agriculture, the sector that has always 
been Indonesia’s favourite, was superceded by 
the manufacturing production sectors that 
recorded an excellent real growth during this 
period. Investments, domestically and from 
abroad, regained its momentum by comprising 
almost one third of the aggregate demand 
 
Table 2 Selected Key Macroeconomic Indicators of Indonesia, 1981-1986 (%) 
Year  Real GDP Growth  Inflation Rate  
Current Account 
(% of GDP)  
Nominal Export 
Growth  
1981  8.15  9.48  -0.61  -18.05  
1982  1.1  11.79  -5.62  -9.0  
1983  8.45  10.46  -7.42  1.65  
1984  7.17  4.73  -2.09  6.55  
1985  3.48  5.83  -2.17  -7.80  
1986  5.96  9.28  -4.67  15.21  
Average  5.72  8.60  -3.76  -1.91  
Source: World Development Indicators CD ROM (World Bank, 2004)  
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elements (van der Meulen Rodgers, 1994). 
This fact can be seen from Table 3 whereby 
manufacturing value-added as a percentage of 
GDP has outpaced agricultural value-added 
most notably from 1991 onwards. The 
manufacturing sector recorded a quarter’s 
share of GDP in 1996 whereas agriculture 
sector only recorded around 16 percent of 
GDP as compared to almost 23 percent in the 
early 1990s. Both GDP growth and inflation 
rates were more stable during this period 
although the inflation rate was still considered 
high. Perhaps at that point in time, the goal of 
the authorities was to keep inflation from 
recording double digits. The current account 
deficits have been relatively stable and 
fluctuate around 1–3 percent of GDP over the 
years. Exports growth showed double digit 
growth occasionally in 1987, 1991, and 1992, 
with the rest of the years showing a 
sustainable rate of export growth.  
 
Table 3 Selected Key Macroeconomic Indicators of Indonesia, 1987-1996 (%) 
Year  Real GDP Growth  Inflation Rate  
Current Account 
(% of GDP)  
Nominal Export 
Growth  
1987  5.30  9.28  -2.66  14.62  
1988  6.36  8.04  -1.57  1.05  
1989  9.08  6.42  -1.09  6.74  
1990  9.0  7.81  -2.61  3.36  
1991  8.93  9.41  -3.32  18.78  
1992  7.22  7.53  -1.10  13.71  
1993  7.25  9.68  -1.33  6.11  
1994  7.54  8.52  -1.58  9.94  
1995  8.40  9.43  -3.18  7.72  
1996  7.64  7.97  -3.37  7.56  
Average  7.67  8.41  -2.27  8.96  
Source: World Development Indicators CD ROM (World Bank, 2004)  
 
Year  Agriculture Value-Added  Manufacturing Value-Added  
1987  22.48  16.33  
1988  22.48  19.70  
1989  22.02  17.02  
1990  20.42  18.30  
1991  12.79  14.21  
1992  17.45  19.08  
1993  17.88  22.30  
1994  17.29  23.35  
1995  17.14  24.13  
1996  16.67  25.62  
Average  18.66  20  
Source: World Development Indicators CD ROM (World Bank, 2004) 
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THE INCIDENCE OF THE ASIAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS  
In the discussion of the survey of recent 
developments published by the Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies (BIES) during 
late 1995 and early 1996, the issue of 
“overheating” in the Indonesian economy was 
prominent and debatable (see, for example, 
James 1995; Bird 1996; & Manning and 
Jayasuriya 1996). Soesastro (1995) pointed 
out that there were threats of economic 
overheating by the second half of 1995. 
Factors such as rising inflation, massive 
capital inflows from foreign investors that 
were used to finance property purchases in the 
face of a significant jump in residential and 
commercial property demand, and a widening 
current account deficit contribute to the fear of 
overheating. Massive capital inflows triggered 
property developers in Indonesia to borrow 
money from abroad and mostly denominated 
in US dollars which was stable at that time. 
Some sceptics argued that the inflation rate in 
Indonesia was still in reasonable (and 
decreasing), at 2.3 percent, which cast doubt 
on the overheating of the economy.  
In addition to that, the widening current 
account deficit is not in itself a threat to 
economic stability and thus alleviates any 
possible danger of overheating that will lead 
to economic collapse. This is exactly the case 
for Indonesia since she believed that the 
economy was being driven by excess 
investment over national savings and the 
attraction of foreign capital to Indonesia was 
not used to finance the current account deficit 
per se but to accumulate foreign reserves 
(James 1995). Advocates of the threats of 
“overheating” argued that the deficits may 
push Indonesia into an exchange rate crisis 
and substantial capital outflow but Bird (1996) 
counter-argued this view by showing the facts 
that the volatile and decreasing import growth 
should not cause any reasonable concern. 
Moreover, she argued that export growth has 
shown signs of recovery and thus reducing the 
current account deficit and the accumulated 
foreign reserves should guard Indonesia 
against any possible threat of capital outflow.  
Manning & Jayasuriya (1996) argued that 
there are two factors underpinning fears of 
overheating. First, private capital movements 
have replaced public capital utilization to play 
a much larger role. This means that the most 
likely source of any major external shocks 
would be from the capital account given the 
volatility of short-term private capital flows. 
Second, the source of fluctuations in the 
capital account is none other than the ever-
changing political climate in Indonesia. 
Speculations and political uncertainty were 
very pervasive in Indonesia and thus made 
Indonesia very vulnerable to any destabilizing 
capital movements due to the loss of 
investors’ confidence.  
However, the attention which has not been 
paid enough by the authorities to the 
indications shown by the economy has 
rendered Indonesia into the Asian Financial 
Crisis that occurred in 1997 that was initiated 
by the depreciation of Thai Bath. The high 
private sector capital movements has caused 
many banks and firms to collapse, resulting 
into many non-performing loans (NPLs) since 
they were not able to clear most of the loans 
they made. This adverse condition required 
the Indonesian central bank (BI) to bail out 
banks in order to restore people’s trust and 
investors’ confidence. Consequently, it meant 
a depletion of Indonesia’s foreign reserves and 
indicated that major portions of capital inflows 
were used to finance current account deficits 
and only minor parts were being accumulated 
as foreign reserves.  
Those who argued that the fear of over-
heating was “groundless” disregarded the fact 
that political uncertainty is likely to affect 
economic developments and trends in Indo-
nesia. Given that, investors’ confidence would 
be harder to sustain and it was somehow 
overlooked that the 1998 presidential election 
was a critical point for the Indonesian 
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economy that will heighten the level of 
foreign investors’ awareness and cautions.  
Short-term fluctuations in the trade 
balance that have translated into widening 
current account deficits was argued to be 
based on faulty interpretation of crude trade 
data (Manning & Jayasuriya 1996). Yet, if that 
was the case, should it not be the reason and 
concern for an even more alarming danger of 
economic collapse that was heading on 
Indonesian way? At least, this should prompt 
the officials to study carefully the most 
credible data to avoid any misinterpretation, 
especially concerning high and short-term 
capital flows. The reason was that there might 
be a high possibility that projected invest-
ments as well as exports-imports flow data 
that are used in order to record any trade 
balance in the current account and this 
projected investments and exports-imports 
were sometimes overestimated. This only 
available information was perceived to be the 
actual scenario and given only this kind of 
projected information; it is rather straight-
forward for the investors to question the 
soundness of their investment returns and for 
analysts to point out that there were alarming 
dangers of economic downturn.  
Indonesia’s crisis in 1997 began with 
massive capital outflows from the country
6
. 
This massive capital outflows eventually 
brought about the collapse of the Indonesian 
rupiah. In the beginning of the crisis, July 
1997, the rupiah depreciated by 7 percent. 
Then finally on 14 August 1997, the rupiah 
was floated and marked the end of a long 
history of fixed and managed-floating 
exchange rate system. We are going to discuss 
two fundamental reasons behind the financial 
crisis that led to economic downturn in 
Indonesia, namely the over-reliance on short-
term borrowing (Pincus & Ramli 2001) and 
                                                          
6  Indonesia experienced a $ 22 billion reversal of private 
capital flows, from an inflow of $ 10 billions in 
1996/1997 to an outflow of $12 billion in 1997/1998. 
(World Bank 1998b) 
the second is the contagion effect
7
. To discuss 
the first reason, we will start by looking at the 
structure of foreign debt owed by Indonesian 
domestic banks and private corporations in 
1995 until the period before the crisis in the 
middle of 1997.  
Table 4 shows that there was a sharp 
increase in foreign borrowing with significant 
increases in the short-term debt borrowed by 
private firms and banks from the end of 1995 
up to the middle of 1997. The short-term debt 
held by the public sector remained relatively 
stable. These massive capital inflows (foreign 
borrowing) were caused by several factors 
amongst which we will elaborate on three 
important ones
8
. First, the liberalization in the 
banking and financial sector adopted by the 
Indonesian government in the early 1990s 
have paved the way for firms and domestic 
corporations to seek access to the foreign 
capital. Second, the deregulation in the 
banking and financial sector was not 
accompanied by adequate supervision from 
the authorities, thus creating an environment 
conducive to high rates of short-term 
borrowing as it allowed banks to take on 
sizeable foreign currency and maturity risks. 
Third, low interest rates in Japan have induced 
outward investment from this country to 
Indonesia in particular and to other Southeast 
Asian countries in general
9
.  
                                                          
7  Contagion is defined here as the spread of economic 
difficulties across countries and often manifest itself as 
a co-movement of, for instance, exchange rates (World 
Bank 2000) 
8  There were other factors that contributed to the massive 
capital inflow into Indonesia. First was the high 
economic growth of Indonesia (about 7–9  percent of 
GDP rate) that gave foreign investors confidence to 
invest in the country. Second was the historically 
predictable exchange rate that reduced perceived risks 
and in turn encouraged investors (Indonesia government 
has been successful in maintaining its real exchange 
rate target ever since the last major devaluation of 31 
percent in rupiah in September 1986). 
9  The main factor that drove the Japanese banks into 
heavy lending to Indonesia and other Southeast Asian 
countries was the existence of relatively higher interest 
rate in these countries. The low interest rate in Japan 
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The 
increase 
in short-
term 
debt 
was 
particul
arly 
significa
nt since 
it 
exceede
d 
foreign 
reserves.
10
 In fact short-term debt in excess of 
reserves does not necessarily cause a crisis. 
However, it renders a country vulnerable to a 
financial panic.
11
 Relatively speaking, 
countries with large foreign exchange reserves 
compared to short-term debt are much less 
vulnerable to a panic, since each creditor can 
be assured that sufficient funds are available 
to meet his claims (Radelet and Sachs 1998b). 
Hence, the fact that pre-crisis Indonesia’s 
short-term debt to foreign reserves ratio 
exceeded 1 as shown in Table 4 made the 
country vulnerable to a financial panic.  
Apart from the fact that Indonesia’s short-
term debt exceeded its foreign reserves, the 
underlying problem with this massive short-
term debt is that apparently most of it was 
used to finance speculative and unhedged 
investments in real estate markets (or other 
non-traded goods) rather than being used to 
increase productive capacity for manufactured 
                                                                            
was due to its fragile banking sector, which was 
affected by the burst out of the 1980’s asset bubble and 
weakened by its stagnant economy in the 1990s. 
10 Note that the actual amount of Indonesia’s short-term 
debt borrowing would be even larger if offshore issues 
of commercial paper and other non-banks liabilities 
were included. 
11 Panic is defined here as an adverse equilibrium outcome 
in which short-term creditors suddenly withdraw theirs 
loans from a solvent borrower. Under these 
circumstances, even sound corporations may be unable 
to roll over their debts (Sachs and Radelet 1998b). 
exports (traded goods) as in the earlier 
periods.  
Table 5 shows that Indonesia’s GDP share 
on traded goods decreased from 40.2  percent 
in 1985 to 38.9  percent in 1995 while the 
share on non-traded goods increased from 
59.8  percent in 1985 to 61.1  percent in 1995. 
Although the figures reflect a relatively small 
change in the GDP share on traded goods to 
non-traded goods, Radelet and Sachs (1998b) 
suggested that it probably understated the true 
amount as firms apparently diverted their own 
working capital and other loans towards real 
estate investments. 
Table 5 Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product 
Share by Industrial Origin (%) 
Item 
Share 
1985 1995 
GDP  100.0 100.0 
GDP (non petroleum)  78.7 91.3 
Traded sector  40.2 38.9 
Non-traded sector  59.8 61.1 
Note: traded sector includes non-food crops, forestry and 
fishery, mining and quarrying, manufacturingindustries. 
Non-traded sectors includes farm food crops; livestock 
and products; electricity, gas and water supply; 
construction; trade, hotel and restaurant. Sources: Centre 
Bureau of Statistics, Economic Indicators (various issues).  
 
 
Table 4  International Claims Held by Indonesian Banks – Distribution by Sectors and Maturity 
(in Billions of US Dollars) 
Period 
Total 
Outstanding 
Obligation by Sector  Debts and Reserves  
Banks  
Public 
Sector  
Non-Bank 
Private  
Short 
Term  
Reserves  
Short Term/ 
Reserve  
End 1995  44.5  8.9  6.7  28.8  27.6  14.7  1.9  
End 1996  55.5  11.7  6.9  36.8  34.2  19.3  1.8  
Mid 1997  58.7  12.4  6.5  39.7  34.7  20.3  1.7  
Note: the data excludes offshore issues of commercial paper and other non-bank liabilities. Source: Bank 
for International Settlements (1998).  
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This analysis has also been highlighted by 
Nasution (1999) where he argued that the low 
quality of investment was funded by massive 
short-term capital inflows as can be seen from 
the widening current account deficit and 
mounting of external debt. This phenomenon 
arguably left the country prone to exchange 
rate risks, since rupiah revenue streams were 
expected to repay dollar liabilities. To make 
matters worse, most of this short-term debt 
was unhedged. This was partly due to the 
historical nature of predictable and low rate of 
the rupiah appreciation (Nasution 1999) and 
due to similar reasons that encouraged capital 
inflows into Indonesia that were mentioned 
earlier.  
The second factor that caused the crisis 
was the contagion effect from the region. 
According to Radelet & Sachs (1998b), 
Indonesia appears to be the clearest case of 
contagion in the region. Their argument was 
that, though it was true that there were many 
problems and weakness in the Indonesia 
economy before the crisis, yet by most 
measures
12, Indonesia’s imbalances were 
among the least severe in the region. These 
can be seen in Table 6 and Table 7.  
From Table 6, we can see that Indonesia’s 
current account deficits in 1996-1997, at an 
average of 3.5  percent, was the lowest as 
compared to the other three countries and 
from Table 7, we can see that Indonesia’s 
budget had been in surplus by an average of 
over 1 percent of GDP for four years.  
In analyzing Radelet and Sachs’ 
argument, we start by looking at the contagion 
factors that suggested the most prominent 
contagion effect came from the Baht crisis and 
the weakening Japanese economy. The Baht 
crisis started on 2 July 1997 with floating of 
the exchange rate and spread quickly to 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Hill 
1999). The two possible transmission 
mechanisms for the spread of the Thailand 
                                                          
12 Most measures are defined here as the usual few 
macroeconomic statistics which are regarded as relevant 
to measure the economic fundamentals of a country, 
such as the size and the rate of growth of current 
account deficits, and government fiscal balances 
(Radelet and Sachs 1998b). 
Table 6 Current Accounts of the Four Southeast Asian Countries in the Region (  of GDP) 
Countries  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  
Indonesia  -4.40  -4.40  -2.46  -0.82  -1.54  -4.27  -3.30  -3.62  
Malaysia  -2.27  -14.01  -3.39  -10.11  -6.60  -8.85  -3.73  -3.50  
Philippines  -6.30  -2.46  -3.17  -6.69  -3.74  -5.06  -4.67  -6.07  
Thailand  -8.74  -8.01  -6.23  -5.68  -6.38  -8.35  -8.51  -2.35  
Note: current account used here is based on NIA Definition.  
Source: International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.  
 
Table 7  Government Fiscal Balances of the Four Southeast Asian Countries in the Region (% 
of GDP)  
Countries  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  
Indonesia  0.43  0.45  -0.44  0.64  1.03  2.44  1.26  0.00  
Malaysia  -3.10  -2.10  -0.89  0.23  2.44  0.89  0.76  2.52  
Philippines  -3.47  -2.10  -1.16  -1.46  1.04  0.57  0.28  0.06  
Thailand  4.59  4.79  2.90  2.13  1.89  2.94  0.97  -0.32  
Sources: International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. 
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crisis into Indonesia were, firstly, by means of 
trade links. The crisis in Thailand might 
spread into Indonesia if the declining 
economic activity and imports in Thailand 
decrease Indonesia’s exports. However this 
possibility seems implausible since the 
merchandise trade connections between 
Indonesia and Thailand are quite weak 
compared with Indonesia’s exports to Japan 
and U.S., as shown by Table 8.  
Table 8 Share of Indonesian Exports to 
Selected countries, 1991-1997 (%) 
Period Thailand USA Japan 
1991-1995 1 14 31 
1996 2 14 26 
1997 2 14 24 
Source:  Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 
IMF (1998).  
The second is due to sharing a common 
creditor—a country with large share of 
lending in the region. As has also been 
discussed by Karminsky and Reinhart (2000), 
besides trade links, different countries are 
interdependent if they borrow from the same 
creditors. It seems this was the case for 
Thailand and Indonesia as these two countries 
borrowed mainly from the same creditors, 
which was Japan. This is shown in Table 9 
whereby both Indonesia and Thailand 
borrowed substantially from Japan with the 
highest share of claim amounted to 47 percent, 
40 percent, and 40 percent for Indonesia and 
58 percent, 60 percent, and 54 percent for 
Thailand during 1995, 1996, and 1997 
respectively.  
So it is clear that the Thai contagion effect 
spread to Indonesia through capital accounts 
and not by the mean of trade links as has also 
been discussed by Hill (1999).   
On the two different views, we believe 
that there was insufficient convincing 
evidence that The Baht crisis was the 
fundamental reason behind the crisis in 
Indonesia. If we were to consider Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan, they also lie within the 
region but they were relatively less affected by 
the regional downturn. During the crisis, Hong 
Kong managed to maintain its currency parity 
against the US dollar despite strong 
speculative attacks
13
, while Singapore
14
 and 
Taiwan opted to float their currencies rather 
than lose their reserves in an attempt to 
stabilize the exchange rate. The depreciation 
rate of both the Singapore and Taiwan 
currencies was about 18 percent over the year. 
This figure was well below that in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines whose 
depreciation rates were 151 percent, 52 
percent and 52 percent respectively (Corsetti, 
Pesenti, & Roubini 1998a). We will not 
pursue further such cross-country comparisons 
since it is not of a particular interest of this 
research. However, it is worth emphasizing 
the fact that the Thai crisis was only a 
triggering factor that brought the underlying 
fragile macroeconomic structures of Indonesia 
to the surface. This fact has also been 
suggested by a former study done on the 
Indonesia crisis by Iriana & Sjoholm (2001) 
suggesting that contagion from Thailand 
served only as a trigger for the Indonesian 
crisis.  
Now, another possible explanation related 
to contagion was the deepening crisis 
experienced by Japan in 1997. The deepening 
crisis experienced by Japan in 1997 caused 
many of its banks, which had heavily lent to 
Indonesia (and other Asian economies) since 
the eighties and nineties (due to low interest 
                                                          
13 Hong Kong’s ability to defend its exchange rate parity 
was due to the increment in the short-term interest rate 
by the Monetary Authority. With high nominal and real 
interest rate, it helps prevent an acceleration of the 
capital outflow and hence convince the international 
market about the credibility of the Hong Kong’s 
commitment to keep its exchange rate parity fixed. 
However, it was misperceived as due to the presence of 
Currency Board System (CBS) in Hong Kong that 
motivated President Soeharto to practice it in order to 
stop the downward fall of rupiah in face of the 1997 
crisis (Corsetti, Roubini, and Pesenti. 1998b). 
14  Singapore has been engaging in a managed-float 
exchange rate regime before the crisis. 
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rates in Japan as discussed previously), to 
suffer capital losses as they were required to 
re-balance their portfolio in order to meet the 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) standards. 
Since the capital adequacy requirement was 
higher for international than national lending, 
it has forced many of those banks to recall 
foreign loans lent to Indonesia and other Asian 
countries. This was an important factor, which 
contributed to the sudden capital flight 
experienced by Indonesia during the crisis, as 
most of the Indonesia credits (about 35 
percent of its total debts) were borrowed from 
Japan. This can be seen from Table 10.  
Again, we do not share the same belief 
that this is the fundamental reason behind the 
crisis in Indonesia. If only Indonesia managed 
its short-term debts prudently and used them 
to invest in the manufacturing sectors to boost 
exports by optimizing the productive capacity 
of the economy, then those short-term debts 
would be able to generate dollar revenues 
needed to pay the debts back. Although the 
revenues generated from export may not 
necessarily be enough to cover all the debts 
but at least it will buffer the country from 
significant exchange rate risks. We believe 
that if only Indonesia managed its short-term 
debt more prudently, the impact of the sudden 
capital flight, due to the Japanese weakening 
economy that forced its banks to call back 
their loans from Indonesia, would not be as 
severe as it has happened. So to reiterate 
again, the underlying problem is in the country 
itself. A weakening Japanese economy had the 
same role to play as the Thai crisis in relation 
to Indonesia’s crisis. It only served as a 
triggering factor which brought the internal 
Table 9 International Claims Held by Indonesian and Thailand Banks - Distribution by Country 
of Origin (Billion of US Dollars)  
Country/ Period  
Total 
Outstanding  
Claims Held by Banks From  
Japan  USA  Germany  All Others  
Indonesia       
End 1995  44.5  21.0  2.8  3.9  16.8  
End 1996  55.5  22.0  5.3  5.5  22.7  
Mid 1997  58.7  23.2  4.6  5.6  25.3  
Thailand       
End 1995  62.8  36.9  4.1  5.0  16.8  
End 1996  70.2  37.5  5.0  6.9  20.8  
End 1997  69.4  37.7  4.0  7.6  20.1  
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1998).  
Table 10 International Claims Held by Indonesian Banks-Distribution by Country of Origin 
(Billion of Dollars)  
Period  Total Outstanding  
Claims Held by Banks From  
Japan  USA  Germany  All Others  
End 1995  44.5  21.0  2.8  3.9  16.8  
End 1996  55.5  22.0  5.3  5.5  22.7  
Mid 1997  58.7  23.2  4.6  5.6  25.3  
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1998). 
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distortions within the country to the surface.  
In conclusion, we believe that the 
fundamental reasons behind Indonesia’s crisis 
in 1997 were weak corporate governance and 
the frail macroeconomic policies of the 
country. Weak corporate governance has 
resulted in a large ratio of short-term debt to 
foreign reserves and thus exposed the country 
to a financial panic. Frail macroeconomic 
policies has resulted in the mismanagement of 
the short-term debts and left the country even 
more vulnerable to exchange rate risk. 
Contagion effects from The Baht crisis and a 
weakening Japanese economy contributed to 
blow up the distortions that were already in 
place. In light of this consideration, a study 
carried by IMF (1999) confirmed the 
importance of economic fundamentals and 
shows that several countries affected by the 
financial crisis shared similar weaknesses.  
However, it is important to note that 
though these contagion effects were not the 
fundamental reasons behind the Indonesia’s 
crisis, their role in initiating the Asian 
financial crisis is significant and should not be 
overlooked (as noted earlier, the economic 
imbalances of a country alone may not be 
enough to produce a crisis). This is 
particularly very true in the type of crisis that 
originates from a financial panic which is 
exactly the type of crisis that hit Indonesia in 
1997. Under normal circumstances, short-term 
debts can easily be rolled over. However, the 
Baht crisis has alarmed international investors 
to re-evaluate their investments within the 
whole region (including Indonesia). Thailand 
crisis also amplified Japanese banks to further 
call in their loans. These revealed the 
distortions that took place (i.e. a relatively 
large short-term debt to foreign reserves) in 
Indonesia and translated them into financial 
panic. Once a crisis started, each creditor 
knows that there might be insufficient liquid 
foreign exchange reserves for each short-term 
creditor to be fully paid, so every involved 
party rushed to be the first in line to demand 
full repayment.  
Once creditors begin to believe that the 
other creditors are no longer willing to roll 
over the debt, each of them will try to call in 
their loans ahead of other investors
15
, so as not 
be the one left without repayment out of the 
limited supply of foreign exchange reserves 
(Radelet & Sachs 1998b). Here, it is clear that 
the Thai crisis and a weakening Japanese 
economy played important roles in starting the 
crisis. If it was not the Thai crisis that 
‘encouraged’ investors to reassess their 
investment and weakening Japanese economy 
that forced Japanese banks to recall their loans 
from Indonesia, Indonesia’s weaknesses 
would not be revealed and panic among 
investors could be avoided as short-term debt 
can be easily rolled over under normal 
circumstances.  
Furthermore, if Indonesia had sufficient 
foreign reserves compared to short-term debt 
and strong economic fundamentals, a 
reassessment carried by investors might not 
lead to a panic (or if there it did, at least it 
would not be so severe), and the crisis might 
have been avoided or mitigated. This is to re-
emphasize and justify the points made earlier 
that the fundamental reason behind 
Indonesia’s crisis in 1997 lied in the country’s 
frail economic fundamentals itself.  
All in all, we should take note about the 
important domestic factors that caused 
Indonesia to suffer severely during the crisis 
years. As we have argued earlier, the 
authorities’ failure to dampen the overheating 
pressures is the first and foremost reason. 
Secondly, the maintenance of pegged 
exchange rates or predictable rates of depre-
ciation has encouraged inadequate hedging of 
external borrowing by both the financial and 
the corporate sectors. Failure to do this has 
caused tremendous debt and huge capital flow 
reversal that has resulted from massive 
                                                          
15 A situation called creditor grab race. 
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depreciation of the rupiah. Next is the weak 
prudential regulations and financial oversight 
that led to a sharp deterioration in the quality 
of domestic bank’s loan portfolios. The high 
figures of non-performing loans (NPLs) have 
caused many bank runs and collapse, which in 
turn destabilize the economy further. Lastly, 
non economic factors that include political 
uncertainties, lack of transparency, and loss of 
confidence in the government have also 
played a part.  
INDONESIAN MACROECONOMIC 
CONDITION AND DEVELOPMENT 
POST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS  
Macroeconomic conditions in Indonesia 
still remain quite frail even after some 
remedies have been applied to bring back the 
sustained level of development in Indonesia. 
In short, the progress of economic recovery 
has been rather slow. The repercussions from 
the devastating financial crisis are very 
persistent since many key macroeconomic 
indicators continue to show sluggishness in 
recent years.  
The GDP growth fell to historical low of 
−13.13 percent in 1998 coupled with a 
declining −14.30 percent per-capita growth. 
The economy shrunk substantially in the 
19971998 peak financial crisis period mainly 
due to the capital flights from foreign sectors, 
high debt service ratio both in the public and 
private sectors as well as the loss of investors’ 
confidence in the Indonesian economy.  
Furthermore, many jobs have been lost in 
these periods thus creating even a severe 
recessionary pressure in the domestic 
economy that brought back the recurrent 
inherent structural difficulties such as high 
unemployment figures, income gap, as well as 
poverty incidence in Indonesia.  
Inflation rate shoot up to 57.64 percent 
and 20.5 percent in the crisis period and 
effectively resulted into a negative real interest 
rate of −24.6 percent in 1997 and subsequently 
recorded a positive 11.8 percent in 1998 due 
to the inducement of high nominal interest rate 
to attract domestic savings and deposits to bail 
out certain banks’ insolvency and to curb 
further inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, 
the speculative motives within the same period 
have worsened the Indonesian economy 
instead of helping to speed up the recovery 
process. This condition put another pressure 
on the Central Bank to expand to money base 
within the crisis period as shown by table 11 
above that money growth amounted to 25.25 
percent and 62.76 percent in 1997 and 1998 
respectively. Export and import growth have 
shown decreasing rates within this crisis 
period as well due to many halted domestic 
productions and major reduction in the 
purchasing power resulted from several 
depreciation of rupiah as well as the 
breakdown of historically managed-floating 
exchange rate system into a market-
determined (free-floating) exchange rate 
system during the crisis period. Years after the 
1997-1998 crisis period has shown slight 
improvements in these key macroeconomic 
variables as depicted in table 11 above.  
Despite progress after the Asian financial 
crisis, the Indonesian macroeconomic struc-
ture still suffered fragility due to certain 
challenges from domestic and foreign sides
16
. 
Domestically, a relatively slackened perfor-
mance of exports and low investment ratio 
coupled with historically lofty incremental 
capital to output ratios (ICOR) indicated long-
lasting repercussion effects of the financial 
crisis on growth prospects and economic 
stability of Indonesia (Nasution 2002). More 
than that, fiscal stimulus has been used to 
offset both external and domestic debts as well 
                                                          
16 Apart from these economic factors, political features are 
worth noting as well. The pace of transition, or the so 
called “reformation”, into democracy has been very 
slow and an increasing demand for local autonomy has 
made a coordinated decision-making process even more 
difficult. This problem is even magnified by the 
incumbent social and political stability that are to be 
restored in such as short period (Nasution 2002). 
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as supporting price subsidies on some state-
sold products, limiting the impact of this 
expansionary fiscal policy in boosting econo-
mic growth. In the banking sector, deregu-
lation, banking, and corporate restructuring 
have taken place, yet the banking system 
remained fragile and sluggish in restoring its 
core intermediation functions. On the other 
hand, the lack of commitment to sound and 
coherent economic policies has begun to erode 
the confidence of the international community 
and foreign investors to root their capitals in 
Indonesia. Not to mention the rising costs of 
production due to new policies designed by 
the government to regularly raise the mini-
mum wages and generous severance benefits, 
which have dampened the willingness of 
foreign investors to invest in Indonesia 
(Nasution 2002). Furthermore, all these uncer-
tain economic policies and lack of soundness 
in policy direction, plus the unfortunate global 
condition such as the September 11 attacks 
and international economic slowdown on top 
of the inherent domestic problems, have posed 
greater challenges for Indonesia to sustain 
macroeconomic stability and economic 
development.  
The economy grew by 4.9 percent, 3.3 
percent, and 3.5 percent in 2000, 2001, and 
2002 (BI report, January 2003)
17
 respectively 
with the per capita growth rates to record 
some positive figures of 3.5 percent, 2 percent, 
and 2.7 percent in 2000, 2001, and 2002 
accordingly
18
. These figures were relatively 
higher than in pre-crisis period. However, 
these rates of economic growth are not large 
enough to absorb the new effective labour 
entering the job markets (Nasution 2002) as 
depicted by the open unemployment rate of 
6.1 percent in 2000, 8.1 percent in 2001, and 
8.3 percent in 2002 as compared to 4.9 percent 
in 1996
19
. Nasution (2002) affirmed that the 
economic recovery is mainly driven by an 
increase in the private consumption whereby 
                                                          
17http://www.bi.go.id/bank_indonesia2/utama/publikasi/ 
upload/SUPLEMEN percent202003-Final_Engl.pdf 
18 The latest figure is based on the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) estimates. 
19 The 2002’s unemployment rate is EIU’s estimate. 
Table 11  Key Macroeconomic Variables of the Indonesian Economy: Crisis and Post-Crisis 
Periods, 1997-2001 (%) 
Year  GDP Growth  
GDP Per  
Capita Growth  
Unemployment 
Rate  
Inflation Rate  
1997  4.70  3.27  4.7  6.73  
1998  -13.13  -14.30  5.5  57.64  
1999  0.80  -0.55  6.4  20.49  
2000  4.90  3.53  6.1  3.72  
2001  3.32  1.97  8.1*  11.50  
 
Year  Real Interest Rate  Export Growth  Import Growth  Money Growth  
1997  8.21  7.80  14.72  25.25  
1998  -24.60  11.18  -5.30  62.76  
1999  11.83  -31.81  -40.68  12.23  
2000  6.59  26.50  21.09  16.62  
2001  5.31  1.88  8.05  12.84  
Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM (World Bank, 2004).  
* Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data.  
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in 2002, consumption expenditures amounted 
to 60 percent of GDP and of this amount 80 
percent was private consumption. This makes 
the effective share of private consumption 
almost half (approximately 48 percent) of the 
GDP in that particular year.  
Unfortunately, this economic recovery is 
not driven by the usual growth engines such as 
investments, exports, and productivity 
improvements. This might explain some 
scepticism about the development prospects in 
Indonesia whereby positive and reasonable 
growth rates were recorded but the unem-
ployment figures remained high and an 
increasing portion of the people fell below the 
poverty line. As argued earlier, there are many 
factors that discouraged inflows of foreign 
direct investments as well as an exports 
resurgence such as the uncertain course of 
economic direction, political instability, 
increasing costs of domestic production, slow 
pace of banking and corporate restructuring, 
fiscal distress, and high non-performing loan 
ratios.  
The historically high ICOR indicated that 
high economic growth prior the crisis was due 
to a high investment ratio that boosted GDP 
growth rather than efficiency improvements 
(Nasution 2002). In addition to that, most of 
these investments were financed by the 
government savings that yielded growing 
budget deficits over the years including those 
during the crisis years and subsequently. All 
these conditions have substantially reduced 
government earnings and thus put a halt to 
many state-funded projects, which in turn will 
contribute to a higher unemployment rate.  
THE CONDUCT OF FISCAL AND 
MONETARY POLICY  
This subsection discusses about the 
importance of the current conduct of fiscal and 
monetary policy in the Indonesian economy. 
This is particularly useful to know how the 
economy has responded to any unexpected 
shocks domestically or foreign-origins. In 
addition to that, the discussion of key 
macroeconomic variables that are important in 
explaining the conduct of monetary policy is 
particularly useful to understand the policy 
options for the Indonesian policymakers and 
to evaluate any responses from future 
unexpected shocks to the economy. 
Furthermore, it will be useful for us to 
determine the appropriate measures to be 
taken in the monetary policy elements to 
ensure the effectiveness of any policy actions 
in tackling any future shocks to the economy.  
Fiscal Policy  
Sustainability of the government budget is 
the main inherent problem in the Indonesian 
economy for the present time and years to 
come (Nasution 2002). The inflexible and 
inefficient tax system is a factor that 
responsible for the insufficiency of govern-
ment taxation revenues that is used to finance 
state projects and state-sold products apart 
from the rising company bankruptcy, 
reduction in trade flows, and consequently 
decreasing personal income after the financial 
crisis. In addition, high subsidies on petroleum 
and electricity add more pressure on 
sustaining balanced-budget system. Further-
more, the government also has several other 
short- to medium-term plans such as 
revamping the financial system, providing 
social-safety nets for the low-income families, 
and the decentralization plans
20
 that require an 
additional expenditure to be added on 
government balance sheet.  
Another problem that has caused 
widening budget deficit is the mounting debts 
waiting to be repaid and the pressure is worsen 
by the recent financial crisis that has made the 
problem seemed to be larger than it seems. 
Soaring debt repayment has been partially due 
to rupiah’s depreciation, interest rate in-
creases, and inflation hike (Nasution 2002).  
                                                          
20 The latest plan requires the state to disburse 25 percent 
of the government revenue to the contributing region. 
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As a response to tackle this budget deficit, 
the government cut non-debt expenditures by 
cutting subsidies on state-sold products, 
petroleum, and electricity services; freezing 
the salary of civil servants; and selling 
government bonds to rich regions (Nasution 
2002). At the same time, the reduction in 
subsidies was also meant to reduce the gap in 
domestic and international prices as to prevent 
illegal exports for arbitraging activities. To 
avoid inflationary pressures created from 
government fiscal policies, authority finance 
the budget deficit through official develop-
ment aid from foreign creditors and 
consultative group on Indonesia (CGI). 
Moreover, inflationary finance is rule out by 
both government policy and Bank Indonesia 
Act in 1999 that bans central bank from 
buying government bonds in the primary 
market except for bailing out banks.  
In fiscal year 2000, the government debt 
outstanding reached 100.7 percent of GDP 
that consisted of 50.8 percent and 49.9 percent 
domestic and external debt respectively 
(Nasution 2002). During the “new order” era, 
the strategy adopted is to obtain long-term 
official development assistance with low 
interest rates to finance and thus relaxing the 
foreign exchange constraints and put less 
pressure on domestic market ability to settle 
the government debts. At this point in time, 
the government use the method of a 
rudimentary domestic financial market to 
finance the outstanding debt. However, the 
interest rates on government bonds that is very 
much sensitive to 1-month SBI rates, the 
inflation rate, and the exchange rate increases 
the burden on the fiscal side of the economy 
as these macroeconomic variables subjected to 
high volatility and uncertainty
21
.  
In summary, the fiscal policy in Indonesia 
has to find its way to increase the tax base 
                                                          
21 Some other mechanisms adopted by the government are 
the sale of public assets and privatization. Refer to 
Nasution (2002) for other related issues regarding the 
external sector’s influence on debt issues. 
revenue apart perhaps by revamping the 
current tax system and to boost more trade 
activities by creating export incentives. The 
relatively underdeveloped and inactive 
secondary market for government bonds 
should be another concern for the authority to 
rely on this method for financing budget 
deficits. If this could be a viable strategy, then 
focused attention should be put on developing 
effective rules and regulation about this 
secondary market and encourage banks to 
include government bonds for their liquidity 
purposes. The function of fiscal policy as an 
“automatic stabilizer” as a counter measure for 
recessionary pressures does not seem to be the 
case for Indonesia due to massive debt 
restructuring that has drained out most of the 
government resources. However, at least, the 
domestic political goal of creating more 
employment through labour-intensive public 
and state works should be achieved by 
government spending to ease the burden of the 
poor that has already hit by adverse impact of 
financial crisis. Lastly, the method of relying 
on foreign official development aid might 
work only for long-term fiscal sustainability. 
The government should take more proactive 
fiscal policies and methods to increase 
revenues in order to ensure the short- and 
medium-term fiscal goals especially in 
restoring the economic conditions after the 
structural changes took place.  
Monetary Policy  
In the middle of 1997, the Indonesian 
monetary authority abandoned the managed-
floating exchange rate system
22
 and sub-
sequently switched into the floating system. 
Effectively, this switch in the exchange rate 
system means that the anchor of monetary 
policy has changed from exchange rate 
targeting to other policy targeting, most 
notably inflation-targeting and monetary base-
                                                          
22 To be more precise, it is a narrow-band managed-
floating exchange rate system prior to this point in 
time. 
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targeting. The formulation of monetary policy, 
especially after the crisis, has been troubled by 
domestic obstacles such as the fragility in the 
banking system, the corporate restructuring 
periods, government budget deficits, and high 
debt outstanding in both public and private 
sectors.  
Base Money  
As mentioned earlier, the anchor of 
monetary policy has changed from exchange 
rate targeting into inflation- and monetary 
base-targeting whereby the monetary base 
target can be understood as a channel between 
the operational rule and the inflation target. In 
addition to that, it is important to note that the 
Central Bank has a direct control only in the 
domestic credit —the domestic component of 
monetary base— as outlined by the 
enforcement of new Bank Indonesia act in 
May 1999. The actual growth of monetary 
base has been consistently higher than the 
original target which is partly due to structural 
changes in the supply and demand of 
monetary aggregates because of administrative 
reforms and major adjustments in the political 
and social system.  
Thus far, Indonesia has not adopted a 
fully-fledged inflation targeting as the nominal 
anchor of the monetary policy because of 
several reasons. Firstly, inflation in Indonesia 
does not only affected by the monetary policy 
directly but influenced by some other factors 
such as high capital flows, exchange rate 
movements, changes in the minimum wage 
rules and regulations, as well as innovations in 
the aggregate demand and supply of the 
economy. Secondly, chief components of the 
price index are very volatile and some of these 
domestic price index components are set by 
the authorities or subject to the standards in 
the international market. This will result into 
uncertainty and high degree of volatility in the 
inflationary processes in Indonesia thus 
creating a substantial bias within the inflation-
target range that magnifies the problem in 
determining the sources of forecast errors. 
Thirdly, a great deal of information is required 
in the decision-making process for inflation-
targeting activities such as the information of 
public and government finances, labour 
market volatilities, financial markets, and the 
goods and services sectors. This information is 
more of a luxury even for the authority since 
the economy is highly subjected to the shocks 
in both supply and demand side as well as 
domestic- and foreign-sourced.  
Thus, monetary-base targeting has been 
an important element of conducting the 
monetary policy in Indonesia especially in 
ensuring the cohesiveness between the fiscal 
stimulus from the government spending and 
the policy made by the Bank Indonesia. 
However, it is clear from the previous sub-
section that this monetary-base policy cannot 
be used by the Bank Indonesia to finance the 
government budget deficit through seigniorage 
that might create some inflationary pressures. 
The monetary-base targeting has been used to 
ensure the smoothness of day-to-day transac-
tion activities conducted in cash.  
Inflation rates  
Post crisis, inflationary pressures has been 
rising steadily because of certain reasons. 
Firstly, the pressures that originated from 
government policies to raise administered 
prices (Nasution 2002) resulted from the 
reduction of subsidies on state-vended 
products as in the case of fuels and electricity 
for example. In addition to that, the pressure to 
regularly revise the minimum wages is also 
affecting a further increase in the inflation 
rate. Periodically, the increase in minimum 
wage has contributed around 9.35 percent and 
12.55 percent to the inflation rate in 2000 and 
2001 respectively (Nasution 2002). Secondly, 
the deteriorating value of rupiah under the 
present floating exchange rate system has 
contributed to a higher inflation rate by 
magnifying the effect from the increase in the 
price of imported goods.  
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This means that inflationary pressures also 
come from the exchange rate pass-through 
effects of the rupiah depreciation. Nasution 
(2002) estimated the pass-through effect to be 
around 0.13-0.23 in the post-crisis periods. A 
lot of explanations could come from this 
persistent and high pass-through effect due to 
the depreciation of rupiah. First of all, greater 
import penetration most notably in 2000 
makes import prices to have more influencing-
powers in the domestic general price level for 
all goods —raw, intermediate, and finished 
goods— and this has a persistent effect 
throughout the years. Next is the lack of 
confidence in holding the rupiah, thus rupiah-
denominated assets that causes an increase in 
the demand of dollar-denominated assets and 
aggravates the pass-through effect from 
depreciation measure taken on rupiah. 
Subsequently, this has caused a “bandwagon” 
effect to the domestic producers as well even 
though they do not have any import content in 
their production processes in argument to 
protect themselves against high and volatile 
inflationary pressures in the goods and 
services market. Thirdly, during the crisis 
periods and after some companies can still 
transfer the effect of rupiah depreciation in the 
form of higher prices due to higher costs. 
Fourthly, Indonesia has been known to have a 
long history of high and variable inflation 
records and some related measures to curb this 
problem has always been short-lived and 
temporary in nature. Lastly, the slow progress 
of structural reform activities and the 
uncertainty about future economic conditions 
and directions has contributed to a slow 
recovery in regaining economic efficiency that 
could help to strengthen the rupiah.  
Interest rates  
In the middle of 1998, at the peak of the 
financial crisis, the domestic benchmark 
interest rate —1-month sertifikat bank 
Indonesia (SBI) rate, the equivalent of short-
term interest rate measure— reached a 
staggering 70 percent. Subsequently, after 
some interventions and slight improvements 
of the economy, it fell to an average 11 
percent in 2000 and rose again to 17.62 
percent by the end of 2001. Real interest rate 
has been maintained to be around 5 percent 
annually since the year 2000. Gradual 
increment in the level of interest rate since the 
middle of year 2000 was a reflection of a tight 
bias monetary policy adopted by BI to 
mitigate the pressure on inflation and the 
exchange rate. In addition to that, the 
continual interest rates increment was due to 
slowness of bank restructuring effort and the 
narrow secondary government bond market 
that was reflected in small trading activities.  
The authority, thus, started to put extra 
attention in developing the secondary market 
for government bonds in order to boost 
liquidity and to dampen the increment in the 
interest rate. The efforts yielded less 
favourable results since banks continued to 
rely on the inter-bank money market to ensure 
their liquidity instead of relying on the 
shallow and relatively premature the secon-
dary market for government bonds. This 
condition explains the driving forces behind 
the persistent increase in the interest rate level 
in the Indonesian economy. The effect of this 
high interest rate is none other than the 
difficulty in repaying domestic debts reflected 
in the government budget deficits and at the 
same time put extra pressure on banks and 
their respective borrowers that relied mostly 
on external debt financing. Furthermore, this 
also explains a growing number of NPLs and 
widening budget deficits that caused fiscal 
distress. These have caused the sustainability 
of economic progress even more difficult.  
Exchange rate  
Following the crisis, rupiah has been 
depreciated substantially from Rp 2450 in 
June 1997 to a low Rp 15000 in the middle of 
1998. The authority has also formally 
switched the exchange-rate regime from 
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managed-floating into a fully-float system. 
The persistent depreciation of rupiah was 
mainly due to both internal and external 
factors. Internally, a limited supply of foreign 
currencies in the domestic foreign exchange 
market due to lack of public and private 
capital inflows since most exporters are less 
willing to repatriate major portion of export 
revenues because of rupiah’s volatility. 
Externally, the disbursement of loans from the 
IMF and World Banks were uncertain and the 
debt-rescheduling activities have raised the 
requirement of foreign exchange, thus putting 
extra pressures on depreciation of rupiah
23
.  
Subsequently, Bank Indonesia has taken 
some exchange rate-related policies such as 
open market operations of selling SBIs and 
using its foreign exchange reserves to meet the 
demand of foreign currencies and corres-
pondingly to guard the rupiah from 
depreciating further. In addition, BI also 
restricted rupiah transactions between banks in 
Indonesia and non-residents to reduce the 
extent of speculations in the offshore market
24
.  
Furman & Stiglitz (1998) found in their 
analysis on emerging economies including 
Indonesia that the level and duration of high 
interest rates affect the exchange rate 
depreciation significantly. However, Goldfajn 
& Baig (1999) and Basurto & Gosh (2001) 
found little supporting evidence that higher 
interest rates affecting exchange rate 
depreciation in their study on some Asian 
countries that include Indonesia. This study 
has provided us with an understanding that 
during the crisis period whereby the interest 
rate was high, the rupiah has depreciated 
tremendously. However, the link become less 
clear when the interest rates level have went 
                                                          
23 Some other reasons include panic buying of dollars to 
repay corporate debts, increasing speculative activities 
in the rupiah offshore market, and unfavourable ratings 
from international agency such as S&P 500 regarding 
the country’s economic and political risks. 
24 The negative consequence is that the limited supply of 
foreign exchange from non-residents has reduced the 
appeal of domestic foreign exchange market. 
down to a much lower region but we still 
witnessed a persistent depreciated value of 
rupiah after the crisis subsided.  
The importance of exchange-rate as one 
of the monetary policy element is worth 
noting. Although the recent system of floating 
exchange rate system took place, Bank 
Indonesia still monitor closely the movement 
of rupiah since this is a very central issue in 
Indonesia’s trading activities as well as the 
issues regarding outstanding public and 
private debts. It is important to know the 
supply and demand side of the exchange rate 
movement in Indonesia depend substantially 
on the public and investors’ confidence on the 
economic policy course and sound macro-
economic management of the country. Thus, 
in conducting a useful monetary policy, BI has 
to ensure that foreign exchange earnings will 
be repatriated back by guarding the stability of 
rupiah through some prevention in the 
offshore market and other speculative activi-
ties. Furthermore, BI needs to correct the 
negative market sentiment about rupiah that is 
heavily related to domestic condition and the 
soundness and integrity of their policy dis-
cretion. With stable exchange rate, Indonesia 
can further enhance the macroeconomic 
performance and to ensure the sustainability of 
non-inflationary economic growth.  
CONCLUSION  
Indonesia’s pre-crisis condition was 
vulnerable to an impending crisis due to the 
overreliance on short-term borrowing. The 
over-reliance on short-term borrowing has, in 
turn, placed Indonesia vulnerable to financial 
panic and exchange rate risk. Indonesia was 
vulnerable to a panic, as it possessed large 
proportion of short-term debt to foreign 
reserves coupled with the country’s weak 
corporate governance, e.g. the adoption of the 
banking and financial sector deregulation 
without adequate supervision. Second, 
Indonesia was vulnerable to an exchange rate 
risk since most of the short-term debts were 
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used to finance less productive investments 
that yielded rupiah revenue which were 
expected to repay dollar liabilities. These 
factors have magnified the country’s weak 
macroeconomic policies and pointed out a 
need for better and more coordinated policy 
design and implementation.  
Subsequent periods have witnessed the 
recovery periods which progress at a “snail 
pace”. Indonesia is still left largely with the 
problem of rising unemployment and huge 
debts to be settled upon. These structural 
changes happen at the same time where the 
reformation era took place which gives birth 
to the so called “true democracy” period. 
These two factors have made the direction of 
economic course for the Indonesian economy 
to be rather uncertain. This is understandably 
so because without a stable government 
coupled with the hurdles of structural changes 
that Indonesia has to deal with, it will be very 
difficult to achieve the ultimate economic 
goals and increase the welfare of the 
Indonesian economy. More changes are 
expected to take place as the country 
embraced herself in a direct presidential 
election in July 2004 (and possibly September 
2004) that will determine further whether 
stability could be sustained, at least geo-
politically, in the short- to medium-term. The 
result of the coming election and consequently 
the new government is hoped to come up with 
more certain future economic policy and 
direction. This is highly required to provide an 
added force to boost slacken economic 
recovery and regaining momentum to reach 
the ultimate goal of sustained economic 
growth.  
Most notably, the conduct of monetary 
policy and fiscal policy has changed. The 
exchange rate regime has changed from the 
long-history of fixed and managed floating 
system into a market-determined exchange 
rate system. Monetary policy is aimed specifi-
cally at stabilizing the domestic medium-term 
inflation to promote sustained economic 
growth to provide added momentum towards 
economic recovery (BI 2003, 2004). At the 
same time, monetary policy tries to maintain 
the stability of the rupiah in the face of other 
foreign currencies to boost the trade activities 
and to minimize fluctuations by prudent 
intervention that is necessary to absorb excess 
liquidity and fiscal expansion. Further cuts in 
interest rates are also on its way at a gradual 
pace that is consistent with the achievement of 
inflation targets (BI 2003, 2004).  
Fiscal policy, by and large, is still aimed 
specifically at developing major infrastruc-
tures for the suburban areas and under-
developed provinces as to restore the public 
confidence on government. In addition to that, 
fiscal policy is also aimed at stimulating the 
domestic economy as well as to settle the 
domestic debts. Major efforts have also been 
put to revamp the banking system, to ensure 
financial system stability, and to promote the 
banking sector’s recovery and restoring its 
intermediary function to stimulate progressive 
economic recovery as well as enhancing the 
effectiveness of the payment system (BI 2003, 
2004). An agency like IBRA (Indonesian 
Banking Restructuring Agency), for example, 
has been set up to deal with the debt-financing 
issue through the divestation of public assets 
and privatization of state-owned companies 
that is hoped to provide a better way in 
financing the mounting debt without the need 
of losing the conventional fiscal policy’s 
function as an “automatic stabilizer” during 
recession time, i.e. through sustained govern-
ment spending.  
Issues such as the structural change in the 
exchange rate system from the fixed and 
managed-floating into a free-floating type and 
the change in the intermediate target from 
boosting trade performance and improving 
growth performance through external trade 
into stabilizing the short- and medium-term 
domestic inflation are examples of the 
importance of this paper in relation with future 
research devoted to the Indonesian economy. 
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In particular, this paper is a very useful 
background summary for researchers who 
intend to develop an economic model for 
Indonesia and subsequently to analyze the 
main features of it. At the very end, we hope 
that through this research, we would be able to 
spark more interests to researchers, and 
economists in particular, to study more about 
the Indonesian economy.  
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